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BOOK REVIEWS
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS. By Wilber G. Katz.
Evanston: The Northwestern University Press. 1963. Pp. 318. $3.50.
Dissociation of religion from government is a comparatively novel

idea. Most of our forebears in colonial America, in England, and elsewhere until two centuries ago were confident that God, or a collection of
gods, benign or malign, ruled man. Hence a sensible ruler decided what
divinities controlled matters, and prudently allied himself with the ruling

supernatural powers, wisely and for his subjects' own good constraining
his people to concur in acceptable ritual of praise and propitiation. Any
idea that each subject should be free to make up his own mind as to what
sort of God regulated man's affairs or what would please Him was clearly
a ridiculous concept. Was every peasant or tinsmith as good a theologian
as the ruler's learned doctors? Should the ruler allow his silly vassals to
offend the Almighty, causing that irritable and all-powerful Ruler to visit
on the whole people murrains, wars, famines, meteors, the Black Death?
About 1775-one suggests a date somewhat at random, conscious of
a half-century's probable error-a great many men on the Englishspeaking western Atlantic seaboard had at length come to the conclusion
that certain of the premises of theocracy were so debatable that compulsory commitment to any was impracticable. Hence arose that difficult
and intricate disentangling we lightly call "separation of Church and
State." This dissociation was painful and slow; for the two had been
fused for so long, and religious ideas had for so many millennia pervaded
our ancestral society, that no sudden constitutional resolution could entirely divorce the one from the other.
I illustrate the predicament with an example recently presented in the
public schools of an American city. The principal of a junior high school
decided that his young charges were capable of more mature work in social studies than had customarily been required. He found that in a
nearby university eminent scholars had written a history of western civilization suitable for use in a college survey course. The good principal decided to try it for his junior high school pupils. The books were provided
at taxpayers' expense. The authors of the text had decided, reasonably
enough, that a history of western civilization necessarily should include
some account of the origins and development of and differences within
the Christian church, and the book contained a respectful, scholarly, and
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dispassionate exposition of these matters as the authors saw them. Some
of the junior high pupils had never seen anything quite like this; they
very naturally told the story at home.
The principal was distressed, shortly, to have a visit from a group
of clergymen among whose parishioners were the parents of their junior
high pupils. Their church, the visiting clergy told the principal, had firm
convictions as to its own origin and authenticity. They announced that
it was none of the public schools' business to "teach religion," or to "teach
about religion" (unfortunately two newspapers reported this story in
these two different ways). Dispassion, detachment, scholarly judgment,
the unhappy principal perceived, all involved a taking of sides. To affirm
that any proposition is rationally debatable is to undermine unquestioning
faith in it. The principal sent for the publicly-owned books, proposing to
cut out the offending chapter from each copy.
"Book mutilation" forthwith became a cause celebre in the unfortunately divided town. A well-known society dedicated to civil liberties
marshalled its forces against the offending principal. They upbraided the
Board of Education for its principal's intellectual flabbiness. The Board
directed the principal not to deface the publicly owned books. Unfortunately for the development of case-law, but happily for community
peace, neither side brought any lawsuit; and thus we do not know what
the Supreme Court would have told us about church, state, and history.
A bystander who is a partisan of neither cause wonders how in this
situation the poor principal best could achieve harmonious application of
the principal of dissociated religion and government. I think that if I
were on the school board perhaps I should have, in the next school year,
timidly abandoned the ill-fated experiment and substituted some bland
and innocuous course in civics. The inseparable intermingling of religious and lay concepts in much of the educational corpus would have
been demonstrated to me. Far more than the innocuous ritual discussed
in the School Prayer Cases, a dispassionate analysis of the merits of the
Reformation, impressed on pupils with all the prestige of their teacher,
driven home by examinations, could offend the faith of pupils and parents. Yet we clearly should not abandon the study of all history in public
schools. Separation of church and state calls for more than a sweeping
resolve; it requires a continuing series of difficult policy choices, in which
consistency and absolutes are impossible.
Professor Wilber Katz of the University of Wisconsin School of
Law chose this difficult reconciliation for the theme of his 1963 Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University. Mr. Katz is one of the most
reasonable, uncontentious, and courteous scholars now expounding the
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theory of the First Amendment's religious clauses. In this latest book,
containing his three lectures and an epilogue,' he advocates a "principle of
full neutrality" by the state.2 He defines his meaning of this term by
contrasting examples: he notes that Bishop Pike differs from him in
urging that "government may properly aid religion as long as it does not
favor a particular church," while other objectors "demand strict separation, not mere neutrality." Professor Katz' position, one gathers, is
somewhere between these two.
In his first lecture Mr. Katz points out that our American doctrine
of separation is unclearly specified in several constitutional documents.
The relevant constitutional phrases differ inter se-in the two clauses of
the First Amendment which renounce federal legislation "respecting an
establishment of religion" or "prohibiting the free exercise thereof"; in
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against state denial of due process and equal protection; and in variously formulated state constitutional
clauses, which thank God for His guidance and beneficent provision for
man and then, in the same documents, go on to forbid any expenditure
of public funds for religious institutions. These rather intricate prohibitions make government a puzzling business. Mr. Katz takes to task Dean
Griswold of Harvard for his Leary Lecture at the University of Utah in
1963,' in which Mr. Griswold argued for less absolutism in church-state
cases, in substance contending for what Holmes called a little play in the
joints of the machinery of government in order that it may work. I am
a little puzzled to see where Mr. Katz greatly differs from this in his results. He supports the constitutionality of measures such as chaplaincies
in the armed forces, in prisons, and in state hospitals on the ground that
they tend "not to promote religion but to avoid limiting religious free4
dom."
Mr. Katz's second lecture discusses religion in the public schools, the
most perennially troublesome problem in American church-state relations.
He concludes that a formula adopted by the Civil Liberties Union is a
good statement of "neutrality": that Bible-reading and organized prayer
is indoctrination, but that "teaching about religion" is legitimate.' As
appears from the example which I related earlier in this review, the dis1.
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[hereinafter cited as
In the epilogue the author discusses Abington v. Schem, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
and Shorbort v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), thus bringing the subject down through
the decisions of June, 1963.
2. KATz at 13.
3. Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Suprcme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. R.v. 167 (1963).
4. KATZ at 21.
5. Id. at 54.
KATZ].
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tinction in effect is a difficult one. Instruction in history, biology, or
literature, no matter how far from any desire to evangelize, may indoctrinate much more effectively than some routine liturgical formula like
the New York "Regents' Prayer" which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Engel v. Vitale.' I concur cordially with Professor Katz
in his view that public education, even on the grade-school level, cannot
avoid some consideration of the religious element in our history and culture; and like him I certainly would not condone the use of social studies
as a device for intentional evangelization. But I do not see this religious
element as clearly "neutral"; rather some tendentiousness toward religious
influence I should think is justified by countervailing policies, which in the
balancing process of constitutional adjudication the Court would find outwishing the policy of separation. Cannot Engel be reconciled with acceptance of a respectably dispassionate course in social studies, for example,
by reasoning that where the prime objective of the governmental activity
in question is lay-as it is in teaching history, or in furnishing at public
cost R.O.T.C. instruction or chemical apparatus for a Church-college, or
in requiring cessation of commercial work on Sunday, or in taking children alike to public and parochial schools in buses-the incidental aid to
religion is permissible as the dominant purpose is not piety; but where
the activity is purely liturgical, as in school prayers, it is barred? This
reasoning, with a judicious use of de minirmis, would solve a good many
church-state problems. It would not solve all; for example, constitutional tolerance of the opening prayers in the Congress would require
some other theory-possibly the idea that another class of public activity,
which the Dean of the Yale Law School recently called "ceremonial
deism,"' can be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to be
constitutional. Perhaps this is only another aspect of the de minihnis
principle.
So thinking, I turn to Professor Katz' third lecture entitled "Religious Schools-The Price of Freedom," in which he takes up the acute
question of public aid to parochial schools. He points out that some state
constitutions explicitly forbid this public support; but he feels that his
principle of neutrality legitimates the constitutionality of non-preferential
federal support of church-connected educational institutions.' Constitutionality assumed, Mr. Katz, with diffident doubts, comes out in favor of
the aid as a matter of policy because it tends to unburden free religious
6. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
7. I quote Dean Rostow from my memory of his spoken words, I hope correctly.
The phrase occurred in his Meiklejohn Lecture at Brown in May, 1962, which is yet
unpublished.
8. KATz at 74.
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choice.' The constitutional justification for such aid could also be stated
as the theory that parochial schools carry part of the burden of universal
compulsory education; that this is a lay purpose in our society, and that
any incidental aid to religion no more renders the whole unconstitutional
than some incidental inhibition of religious orthodoxy renders unconstitutional a well-rounded public school course in history.
In judgment Mr. Katz and I come out together. Our respective reasoning would not be entirely alike, which is probably not very important.
My difficulty with "neutrality" as a guiding principle is that, for me, it
does not guide very well. A good many governmental activities affecting
religion seem to me tolerable as a matter of constitutionality, and reasonably sound in policy, but do not seem neutral in effect. Of this the high
school history course, of which I told in the early part of this review, offers a good example. One is driven to giving weight to governmental
motivation; constitutionalism is not a mathematical process but a weighing of tendencies to see whether underlying constitutional aspirations are
promoted. Of this, Professor Katz presents admirable demonstrations.
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLANDt

STATE AND LAW: SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV THEORY. By Ivo Lapenna.
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1964. Pp. xi, 135. $5.00.

In his study of the political doctrine of communism,' Hans Kelsen
concluded that after more than thirty years of communist rule the Soviet
ideologists proved to be unable to work out an original theory of state
and law based on the Marxian concept of society. In its tortuous development toward classlessness and the utopian paradise of full communism in which state and law would wither away, the Soviet Union in
the period of Stalin bogged down amidstream, being incapable of moving
further ahead and not daring to turn back. Making use of what he referred to as "Marxian dialectics," Stalin declared himself in favor of the
strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship as a preparation for the
withering away of the state. Later, he explained this sophistry, which
violated the basic tenets of Marxism, first by justifying the necessity of
the state as an instrument of defense against internal and external enemies of the Soviet regime, then by insisting that the withering away of
9. Id. at 77-78.
I Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
1. HANS KELSEN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF BOLSHEVISm 34 (1948).

